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Abstract 
Just as in fiction, discursive strategies in history can reveal the very nature of a project. The positivist 
historiography that prevailed in the late 19th and early 20th centuries regarded historical facts as givens. 
Accordingly, it held as its ideal of writing the objective text, that is. the text from which the historian's 
mediation would be carefully erased. The New History, on the other hand, considers all research to be 
grounded in a researcher and seeks to indicate by various means that the text does not generate itself. In 
Carnival in Romans, for example, Le Roy Ladurie explicitly resorts to various facets of the "I": that of the 
histor, going about the job of uncovering the evidence: that of the commentator, providing historical 
parallels and explanations; and even that of the emotional self (Barthes' personne passionnelle), making 
judgments on events and people in the narrative. These changes in writing conventions point to the 
emergence of a new historical paradigm. At the same time, they overturn the view of the historical text as 
a non-problematic vehicle for reporting "reality": this text, for the New Historians, becomes a construct, 
and is presented as such. 
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WRITING THE PAST: LE ROY LADURIE AND 
THE VOICE OF THE NEW HISTORY 
PHILIPPE CARRARD 
University of Vermont 
Once he has selected, classified, and analyzed the documents 
deemed necessary to his undertaking, the historian is faced with the 
same task as the author of fiction: whether his text will consist of a 
story, a description, or a commentary, he still has to write it up. He 
must, among other things, order the material, assign a position to the 
various segments that will make up the work; determine to what extent 
his own discourse will share the text with other discourses, such as 
that of the archives; decide whether his perspective will frame the 
whole endeavor or give way to other perspectives, notably those of 
groups or individuals; and finally, make stylistic decisions, for 
instance in the area of vocabulary and sentence patterns. Even 
though, in Jakobsonean terms, historical discourse is referential and 
not poetic, focusing on the information and not on the message itself, 
these various operations are not trivial or ancillary: just as in fiction, 
they shape the material to be reported. In fact, it could be argued that 
they are all the more significant in that they tend to be taken for 
granted, since the writing process, in history as in most referential 
discourse, is usually regarded as the non-problematic step in which 
data are given linguistic form, made into a text. 
My purpose here is to examine a specific aspect of this 
textualization, and to do so while reading a piece of what is known as 
the New History. The problem I shall investigate is among the most 
routinely considered in narratology: that of "voice." I shall, in other 
words, ask the question "who is speaking" and shall attempt to 
determine the nature, position, and function of this speaker.' As for 
the text, I have chosen a relatively recent work written by one of the 
major French historians of today: Le Roy Ladurie's Carnival in 
Romans, published in 1979. These choices are dictated by various 
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considerations. The few scholars who have concerned themselves 
with the strategies of historical discourse have mostly focused on the 
organization of the narrated, for example on the various types of 
story-line used by the historian to make sense of things. They have 
contended that "emplotment" is one of the essential aspects of the 
historical undertaking, and that story-telling constitutes a type of 
knowledge, a mode of comprehension as valid as (if distinct from) the 
deductive or statistical models of the exact sciences.' However, as 
evidenced in several collections of articles recently published in 
France, Germany and the United States, this kind of research has 
hardly touched questions relating to the very act of narrating.' 
Furthermore, the same research has mainly centered on works written 
in the nineteenth century, or even earlier. Given the changes which 
have occurred in historiography during the last fifty years, it seemed 
worthwhile to examine a text which was more recent and which 
appeared to be representative of present historical writing. Indeed, 
Carnival in Romans can be regarded as combining the two types of 
inquiry currently prevailing in French historiography: the structural 
analysis advocated by the first and second generations of the Annales 
School (insofar as it contains a lengthy synchronic description of 
phenomena related to the longue duree), and narrative history, or at 
least that type of history characterized by what has been called "the 
revival of narrative" or "the return of (to) the event," since the central 
part of the work consists of the telling of a story: that of the carnival 
mentioned in the title.' Of course. I do not claim that Carnival in 
Romans should be considered as the epitome of present historical 
writing, nor that questions related to the reporting of events are 
necessarily relevant when we examine how this research is 
conducted. After all, an enormous number of texts (books, articles, 
discussions, etc.) are bracketed under the label "history," and each of 
them presents its own problems. Structural history, for that matter, 
has a weak narrative component, and it would presumably not be as 
productive to ask questions bearing upon story-telling in Le Roy 
Ladurie's Les Parsans du Languedoc as I deem it to be in Carnival 
in Romans. 
Reading a historical text as what White has called a "literary 
artifact" is highly restrictive indeed.' Because of this narrow focus. I 
shall not deal with issues that might be labelled properly historical. 
Did Le Roy Ladurie have enough evidence in the first place? Does he 
make a legitimate use of this evidence, for example of the tax records? 2
Studies in 20th & 21st Century Literature, Vol. 10, Iss. 1 [1985], Art. 3
https://newprairiepress.org/sttcl/vol10/iss1/3
DOI: 10.4148/2334-4415.1171
Carrard I I 
Could one challenge his interpretation of the events that took place in 
Romans as being traceable to class-related conflicts? Numerous 
reviews have covered these problems, and it is not my purpose-nor is 
it within my area of competence-to take them up once again.' Yet, 
my analysis will not be purely formal. I shall assume that the 
phenomena under consideration are not autonomous, and I shall 
attempt to assess what they mean in regard to the whole enterprise of 
"doing" history. The investigation will unfold in three steps. I shall 
first define the type of narration at work in Carnival in Romans; then, 
I shall examine the various functions of the narrative voice; and, 
finally, I shall try to articulate the relationship between these textual 
conventions and some of the characteristics displayed by the New 
History on other levels.' 
I 
Historical discourse has often been taken to be the prototype of 
objective representation. It is probably revealing that Benveniste, 
while elaborating his famous distinction between "histoire" and 
"discours," should have taken an excerpt from Glotz's Histoire 
grecque as an instance of the former: of the model of communication 
where events are reported "as they happened" and "seem to be telling 
themselves outside of the presence 'of a speaker," as opposed to the 
"discours," where the communication is organized around the "I" of 
the speaker and the "you" of a listener.' Of course, like all 
dichotomies of this type, Benveniste's is open to challenge. Against 
this brand of structural linguistics, the advocates of pragmatics have 
argued that all utterances are traceable to a subject, that all 
statements, even so-called scientific ones ("water boils at 212 
degrees"), are ultimately made by someone and directed toward 
someone else (a summary profile of the speaker who utters "water 
boils at 212 degrees" would include the trait "knows the Fahrenheit 
system"). In the area of poetics, narratologists such as Gerard 
Genette have contended that all texts are conducted by an "I," that 
the only difference between first and third person narratives lies in the 
position of this "I" (whether inside or outside the story ), and that even 
in cases where this first person remains implicit, it is always possible 3
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to find references to it in the form of commentaries, metaphors, or 
generalizations (Figures III, pp. 225-27). Yet, as Genette concedes, 
the "I" is not always present to the same extent (so Benveniste may 
have a point after all). For instance, the narrator situated outside the 
story does not have to remain silent. True, he may leave the text itself 
as the only sign of his involvement (canon: Hemingway's The 
Killers). But he may also take an active part in the reporting of the 
events (Tolstoy's War and Peace), and it is possible to conceive all 
kinds of intermediate stands between these two extremes. In this 
respect, on a scale going from maximum overtness to maximum 
covertness, the "I" that speaks in the historical text would probably 
be located on the side of maximum covertness.9 More precisely, it 
would have been located there since the late nineteenth century, since 
the conventions of positivist writing (of which Glotz's Histoire 
grecque constituted a good example, at least in the example quoted by 
Benveniste) equated scientific truth with an ideal of neutrality: in 
other words, since those conventions prevented the historian from 
taking sides in his story, as Voltaire or Michelet had been allowed to 
do, and instructed him to erase the signs of his presence. 
Set against this model of objectivity, and notwithstanding the fact 
that the latter has never been (some would say: cannot be) fully 
realized, Carnival presents a striking singularity: from the first 
paragraph ("I have long dreamed of writing the story of a small 
town . . . p. 9) to the last one ("The carnival in Romans makes me 
think of the Grand Canyon . p. 408), the reader is constantly 
reminded that the story is being told by an "I." This first person has 
textual and epistemological features which, given its massive 
presence, have to be briefly qualified. Textually, as is generally the 
case in academic historiography, it is heterodiegetic, that is, located 
outside the story: it belongs neither to a witness nor to a participant (as 
opposed to the "I" of memoirs or autobiography ). but to a scholar who 
did not take part in the events he is reporting. Furthermore, in 
accordance with the rule governing serious (vs. fictional) discourse," 
it refers directly to the author: it is Le Roy Ladurie who endorses "I 
have long dreamed . . . ," whereas, for example, it is not Proust but the 
narrator of A la recherche du temps perdu who is responsible for "I 
have long gone early to bed," whatever similarities may be found 
between the two Marcels. Finally, in accordance again with the rules 
of serious discourse, it is an "I" committed to making true statements, 
namely, statements that can be confirmed or disproved by way of 4




empirical verification. In Eugenie Grandet, for instance, Balzac does 
not claim to be telling the story of a real Eugenie; the existence of such 
a character can certainly be investigated, but the findings will neither 
disqualify Balzac's novel nor add to its merit. On the contrary, what 
Le Roy Ladurie asserts in Carnival is supposed to be based on 
evidence: the book is thus open to verification, and it would be 
relevant to inquire, among other things, if there is such a town as 
Romans, and if a carnival actually took place at this location in 1580. 
Reviewers, for that matter, have asked questions of this type, although 
obviously more sophisticated ones than these. 
If the "I- that speaks in Carnival is located outside the story, it is 
also temporally remote from the facts it is recounting. Again, this 
position is not unusual: like fictional ones, most historical texts take 
the form of an ulterior narration, which means that they tell what 
happened, and not what is happening or what will happen." Yet, in 
this respect, historical texts display one peculiarity at least. In fic- 
tion, even when we know at what point in time the author has written 
the story, the temporal distance between the narrator and the text 
cannot generally be specified: nor does it matter, in most cases at 
least. In history, however, the equation author-narrator, as well as the 
fact that events tend to be dated with precision, make it possible to 
measure this distance; and determining the exact length of the time 
lapse appears relevant, since it is not quite the same for an historian to 
write a few months or several hundred years after the facts. As far as 
Carnival is concerned, we know that the book was written in the 
1970s and published in 1979, that is, almost 400 years after the 
events it is reporting. Historically, this remoteness poses specific 
problems (availability of documents, etc.) which lie outside the scope 
of this study. My analysis will thus be limited to considering the 
implications of the narrator's temporal position, more precisely to 
examining whether there are signs of this position within the text 
itself. 
Although Carnival unfolds according to the principle of ulterior 
narration, it does not always adhere strictly to chronological order. 
This order, indeed, is probably impossible to maintain consistently, 
even in texts that do not problematize time and, unlike some types of 
fiction, do not systematically rearrange the events for the sake of 
dramatic schemes. In Carnival, the flow of the narrative is interrupted 
at various moments by diverse anachronies, of which three will be 
considered here. 5
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First, there are numerous but relatively brief analepses, that is, 
textual units that take us back in time. Since the beginning of any story 
(and any history) is to some extent arbitrary, one of the basic tasks of 
the narrator-and one which involves possible temporal distortions- 
consists in providing information on what precedes this beginning. In 
Carnival, Le Roy Ladurie devotes the first four chapters and more 
than 100 pages to a lengthy description of Romans and the Dauphine 
before dealing with the events proper. This description, however, 
cannot cover every detail, and the narrator has sometimes to break off 
the report of what happened in 1579-80 to provide some background 
information, notably when new characters are introduced. To take 
two examples, Paumier, the leader of the lower classes, is given a 
three-page biography (pp. 117-20) upon the mention of his election as 
captain of the drapers' militia on St. Blaise Day in 1579. As for 
Paumier's opponent and leader of the Romans establishment, Judge 
Guerin, he receives a half-page biography (p. 32), which is then 
completed by short flashbacks into his past, mainly into his former 
misdeeds (i.e., his participation in the St. Bartholemew massacre, 
p. 129). These flashbacks add a specific point to the description of the 
background given in the first chapters, and they do not involve any 
moving away from the mode of ulterior narration. Yet, even though 
they do not particularly obtrude, they fracture the continuity of the 
narrative. They thus point to the difficulty of telling things "as they 
happened" in time, as well as to the corresponding role of the narrator 
as a (re )organizer. 
Second, ulterior narration permits numerous occurrences of the 
narrative present. This present is extensively employed in French 
historiography, and it is no accident that it should also be called 
"historical." In Carnival, it occurs with the greatest frequency in the 
central chapters dealing with the events themselves, that is, the first 
incidents of 1579, the bloody confrontations of the 1580 carnival, and 
the establishment's ensuing repression of the lower classes. Of these 
five chapters, for instance, two begin immediately with the present 
(chapter 7: "In 1580, in Romans, it all starts up again like in 1579," 
p. 198; chapter 8: "This episode brings an end to the carnival properly 
speaking," p. 254), and the three others shift to this tense either after a 
few lines (chapter 6: "After Catherine's departure, things go from bad 
to worse," p. 175), or after a few pages (chapter 5: "In Romans, 
everything starts on February 3, 1579," p. 115). Furthermore, Le 
Roy Ladurie turns to the present when he refers not to the facts 6




themselves, but to the activities of his two main sources: Judge Guerin 
and the notary Piemond, who both left accounts of the events. Before 
or within literal quotations, he thus resorts to phrases such as 
"Guerin/Piemond reports" (p. 111), "adds" (p. 228), "continues" 
(p. 245), "tells" (p. 258), "says" (p. 111), or "notes" (p. 233), 
"writes" being of course the expression which is used most 
frequently. 
Both presents are metaphorical indeed: they have the value of a 
passe simple, for Le Roy Ladurie, unlike some journalists reporting 
"live," cannot claim to be telling what he is witnessing. In other 
words, the occurrence of the historical present does not entail here a 
shift from ulterior to simultaneous narration: the account is still given 
retrospectively by a narrator who, for that matter, is not even 
pretending that he does not know the whole story-in particular, its 
outcome. Sentences like "In Romans, everything starts on February 
3, 1579" are prototypes of what Danto calls "narrative sentences": 
statements that concern a specific moment, but describe this moment 
in terms which involve a knowledge of what will happen much later 
("The Thirty Years War began in 1618 ").12 Moreover, it should be 
noted that the same presents do not fulfill the function with which they 
are usually associated. Because they are too numerous and may occur 
at any moment in the story, they lose the faculty of designating this 
moment as "important" or "dramatic": and, by the same token, they 
lose their alleged power of involving the reader "more intensely" in 
the object of his reading. Ultimately, they have to be regarded as signs 
of Le Roy Ladurie's position toward the narrative practices of French 
historiography, particularly toward the way these practices deal with 
what Weinrich has called "the crisis of the passe simple" in current 
French usage:" Le Roy Ladurie treats the two tenses as if they were 
equivalent, and no apparent pattern governs the shift from one to the 
other. This position, let us remark, cannot be grasped in the American 
translation, where most presents, following Anglo-Saxon conven- 
tions of historical writing, have been rendered with preterits-a deci- 
sion which does not alter the information, but obscures the role of the 
narrator, his active .part in the temporal manipulation of the 
material. 
Finally, and this phenomenon is probably the most obvious, Le 
Roy Ladurie turns repeatedly to the future: he tells not what 
happened, but what will happen. These futures have their "normal" 
predictive function. In other words, they must be distinguished from 7
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the "historical" futures which sometimes occur at the end of a 
paragraph written in a past tense, and which can be understood either 
as involving a switch from narration to commentary or as having a 
metaphorical value, as "replacing" a passe simple ("Napoleon chose 
his ministers among conservatives. . . . Up to the end, Napoleon will 
be conservative in his foreign and liberal in his domestic policies or 
inversely, in order to please both tendencies of the French people")." 
Whatever its exact value may be, this second future does not imply a 
radical break with chronological order: like the historical present, it is 
fully integrated into it. On the contrary, the futures that occur in 
Carnival generally disrupt this order. Yet, it would not be legitimate 
to speak in this instance of a shift from ulterior to anterior narration, 
for Le Roy Ladurie is not a prophet: he tells us about things that will 
happen in his story, not after the moment of writing. As there were 
analepses in Carnival, there are also prolepses, two types of them to 
be specific. Most are of the internal kind, which is to say that they 
foretell something which will be told again in the story, or at least 
which will take place within the temporal framework of the same 
story. So, from the first pages, the narrator indicates that the conflict 
will be class-related ( "The carnival in Romans will not contradict this 
'cleavage' between the orders," p. 19), and he forecasts the conclu- 
sion of the carnival as well as the fate of individual characters: 
namely, the failure of the popular movements ("These divergences 
between town and country . . . will weaken the third estate during the 
final crushing of the revolt in 1580," p. 80), and the upcoming 
bloodbath: a certain family "will count one dead" (p. 179), the 
butcher Geoffroy Fleur "will be hanged" (p. 186), in March of 1580 
"1,500 to 1,800 villagers will be put to the sword" (p. 226), etc. 
Furthermore, there are a few external prolepses, that is, futures 
pointing to something that happened after 1580 and the end of the 
story proper. For instance, speaking about the behavior of juvenile 
delinquents in Romans, the narrator states that the "following 
centuries will reduce these brutal attitudes, without abolishing them" 
(p. 249); he announces that the "military pride of the commoners will 
some day claim war as not being the exclusive monopoly of the 
nobility," "will give breath and heart to Murat, Hoche, and Kleber," 
and "will take east thousands of French peasants," who "will follow 
an emperor to Moscow" (p. 384). 
These prolepses fulfill various functions. In the first place, they 
generate dramatic interest. In a book which is long and not overly 8




easy, they provide the reader with what could be described as brief 
previews, and they establish for him that the promise implicitly 
involved in the title (the carnival has to be special since a book is 
devoted to it) will definitely be kept. Moreover, they contribute to 
maintaining the necessary coherence among facts and characters: 
they show that fact Z or character X have not been selected by 
accident, that they bear a precise relation to the point of the story. 
Last, and particularly significant in our view of the text, the use of a 
device as obvious as the prolepsis adds to the foregrounding of the 
narrator, points to his privileged retrospective position and his role as 
an organizer of time. True, this position is not peculiar to Carnival or 
to Le Roy Ladurie. The past, in history, is always recounted from the 
perspective of the present, and it is the knowledge of the outcome, 
even more the knowledge of what happened between this outcome and 
the moment of writing, that enables the historian to assign a meaning 
to the various parts of his story. What makes Carnival so unusual is 
that Le Roy Ladurie makes no attempt to conceal this knowledge, has 
no qualms about presenting his text as being situated in the hic and 
nunc of the narrator-author. In other, words, to resort to a familiar 
metaphor which occurs in the book itself, the historian shows no 
uneasiness when he plays his part as stage director; he states explicitly 
his prerogative to determine when events will be presented on the 
historical "scene" (p. 60), as well as how they will be arranged in a 
"plot" which will "build up" and finally be "resolved" (p. 196). 
The role of the narrator is also foregrounded in operations related 
to the unfolding of the argument. For Le Roy Ladurie, if he knows the 
whole story, knows the whole text too. Thus he occasionally assumes 
the role of a planner, who charts his text with those "organization 
shifters" in which Barthes saw one of the traces left by the allegedly 
absent narrator of historic.al discourse:" signs which do not pertain to 
an external referent but to the process of writing, to the text itself. 
These shifters, in Carnival, can point in different directions. They can 
refer back to an earlier moment ("I have explained in a previous 
paragraph," p. 34), forward to a later moment ("We shall see later the 
strategic importance of this door," p. 263), or announce briefly what 
the historian will or will not be doing ("Let us return to the question of 
power,- p. 375; "I do not plan to tell here about the trial of the 
tailles," p. 369). Whereas the function of the analepses or prolepses 
was to establish some connection between two events, that of the 
organization shifters consists of linking two parts of the text that are 9
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physically remote, or of easing the transition from one part to the 
other. Organization shifters are thus comparable to textual 
landmarks: they add an element of redundancy, and this element 
contributes to the readability of a work that is long and complex. But 
they are also signs of the "I," in this instance of the planning "I." As 
the narrator had moved back and forth in his story, as he, for example, 
had freely used his knowledge of the future, he now shows, at time 
quite informally ("Here we are" I"Nous y voila"I, p. 36), how the 
pieces are fitted together. Whereas the positivist text had tended to 
conceal its strategies, history writing now unfolds in the open, or at 
least more in the open; it is presented not as a natural product but as 
the result of various operations originating in the historian, two of 
them being the selection ("I do not plan to tell") and the ordering 
("We shall see later") of the material, a material for which the claim is 
no longer made that it is "telling itself." 
II 
If the narrator of Carnival makes no secret of his temporal position, 
he is also quite explicit when he performs the various functions that go 
with the writing of the text. The most basic task of any narrator is 
undoubtedly to tell the story, to report the facts. In this capacity, of 
course, Le Roy Ladurie often remains silent: it would be cumbersome 
to refer all data to the subject who has selected and is enunciating 
them, and several passages of Carnival could be taken as examples of 
a text where events are recounted without apparent mediation. Yet, 
already at this most elementary level of "presenting the facts," Le 
Roy Ladurie does not hesitate to introduce an "I": in this instance the 
"I" of the histor, of the researcher going about his job of uncovering 
and gathering the evidence.'6 He may state, for example, that some 
list of tenants is complete, "as I have checked in comparing the two 
pertinent registers" (p. 28); that from the records of the legal 
proceedings, extract a global study on the leaders and participants 
in the popular carnival" (p. 295); or that the third estate, in the 
Dauphine, did not really take on tax collectors, "as I find only a single 
attack of this type . . . in the mouth of its lawyers" (p. 375). 
Similarly, the graphs, tables, and statistics that come with the 10




description of the setting (chapters 1-2) as well as with the interpreta- 
tion of the events (chapters 10-14) are not presented as having 
generated themselves. Le Roy Ladurie speaks of averages 
"calculated by me" (p. 29, p. 48), of statistics "made up by me (p. 43, 
p. 44), and he observes that in order to define the threshold of 
affluence in Romans, he is the one who has "isolated the upper 
bracket of farmers, above 6 ecus" (p. 311). These references to 
activities ("check," "calculate," "make up," etc.) are important 
epistemologically. They display an awareness that data were not "out 
there" ready to be picked up, and that the same data have not simply 
jumped out of the archives: they have been, as de Certeau puts it, 
"produced" by the historian," a process that does not imply that they 
have been invented or falsified. The treatment of numbers is in this 
respect particularly revealing, for numbers, especially when 
machine-generated, are frequently regarded as constituting the 
neutral, objective basis of all inquiry, and as such they play the role of 
an authoritative citation. In specifying that the computation is 
traceable to a researcher, Le Roy Ladurie challenges this alleged 
neutrality. He shows that the uncovering of the facts depends on a 
choice, an intention, a set of hypotheses concerning the nature of his 
undertaking just as he showed that the meaning assigned to these facts 
depended on his retrospective position. 
Although Carnival is characterized, among other things, by a 
return to narrative history, it is not devoted exclusively to the telling of 
events. It also contains a good deal of commentary, a phenomenon 
which appears typical of present historical discourse. In effect, the 
task of the historian is seemingly no longer-as German text linguists 
have it-to propose a new version of an old story (umerzahlen): it is to 
discuss (besprechen) the same story, to offer a new interpretation of 
it." In Carnival, the commentary may take on various forms. It 
occupies almost entirely the last four chapters, where it constitutes 
what some anthropologists would call a "thick description": an 
account that does not claim to be methodologically pure and draws on 
several disciplines, in this instance, beyond historical scholarship 
proper, semiotics and social anthropology. '9 Yet, the commentary is 
not limited to the last section of the book. It is also interspersed with 
the initial synchronic description as well as with the six central 
chapters, which deal with the carnival itself. Obviously, this aspect of 
the book cannot be examined exhaustively. I shall, for this reason, 
focus on the interspersed commentary, more precisely on three of its 11
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facets which constitute highly visible signs of the narrator as a 
commenting "I": historical parallels, a certain type of historical 
explanation, and partisanship. 
One of Le Roy Ladurie's major theses, crudely summarized, is 
that the rituals of carnival exposed social conflicts, and that the 
struggle for fiscal justice of the members of the third estate made them 
into forerunners of egalitarian tendencies which were to develop later. 
This thesis is expounded at length in the last chapter, program- 
matically entitled "The Primitives of Equality." But it also underlies 
several shorter passages, mostly single sentences where the "I" inter- 
venes to draw a connection between what happened in Romans and 
some further revolutionary event. For example, the unhappy drapers 
are compared with "the silk workers who revolted in Lyon in 1832" 
(p. 24); the low involvement of women in Romans with the activities 
of the "tricoteuses and petroleuses of 1793 and 1871" (p. 314); the 
fact that the population in Romans had kept two cannons with the 
significant urban trouble caused much later by the same problem of 
"who will retain the arms" ("I think of the Paris Commune in 1871," 
p. 148); and the different ways of acting out carnival according to 
one's social class with the various types of demonstrations in May, 
1968, demonstrations which were different in character depending on 
whether they were staged by students or workers (p. 333). At times, 
the parallels may also apply to individual characters. The story of 
Colas, who went from being a delegate of the third estate to a leader of 
the nobility, is linked with that of other men whose political path was 
similarly erratic ("I think of Jacques Doriot. Gustave Herve, Marcel 
Deat," p. 108). Textually similar to the prolepses analyzed earlier, 
these associations are signs of the retrospective standpoint of the 
narrator: a narrator who knows the whole history as he knew the 
whole story, and fully assumes ("I think of . .") his privileged 
position. In addition to pointing to the "I," the parallels also 
contribute to the intelligibility of the work. For the lesser-known 
(Romans) is given meaning by connection with the better-known, in 
this instance with the French revolutionary tradition, or some would 
say, because of the mandatory references (Commune, May 68), with 
the French revolutionary mythology. 20 
Another trace of the commenting "I" lies in a grammatical 
phenomenon: the shift from the passe simple or the historical present 
of the narrative to the present of generalizations, of eternal truths. The 
question of the existence (or nonexistence) of historical laws has been 12




widely debated. It opposes, on the one hand, the advocates of the 
unity of science, who aim to bring history under the deductive or 
statistical model of the exact sciences, a model said to be of the 
"covering law"; and, on the other hand, those who think that such a 
model cannot be applied to history (or more generally to the social 
sciences), and has to be replaced by alternative modes of explana- 
tion, narrative being one of them." Le Roy Ladurie, to my knowledge 
at least, has not taken sides in a discussion which has been more of a 
concern for Anglo-Saxon than for French historiography," and his 
way of making sense of things is indebted to various strategies in addi- 
tion to narrative, such as the synchronic analysis and the thick 
description mentioned earlier. There are, however, numerous law- 
like statements in Carnival. But they are expressed in forms that are 
low in "scientific" explanatory value, forms like the proverb ("When 
the cat's away, the mice will play," p. 92; "He who can do more, can 
do less," p. 106; "He who sows the wind shall reap the whirlwind," 
p. 116; "If you leave your place, you lose it," p. 146; "The first step is 
the hardest," p. 252; "Once burned, twice shy," p. 316), or the 
commonplaces of social and political analysis ("People fight well 
only against what they have renounced," p. 165; "Revolution, in a 
small town, occurs among people who know each other," p. 122; 
"Mulattos are sometimes more racist than whites," p. 159; "Troops 
of peasant guerillas offer little resistance to a regular army in pitched 
battles," p. 286). 
It is not always easy to define the narrator's attitude toward these 
generalizing propositions. On the one hand, he is not entirely 
committed to their validity. He cannot seriously present them as 
major premises in a deductive argument, and he would probably not 
claim that he who sows the wind will always reap the whirlwind or that 
people can only fight well against what they have renounced. These 
bits of popular wisdom and common knowledge are offered tongue-in- 
cheek, and their piesence in scholarly discourse constitutes an aspect 
of the humor of Carnival. The same statements, however, are not 
made so ironically as to be ludicrous; they mean what they say, and 
their use implies the belief that they convey some truth. They could be 
subsumed under the category of the "guarded generalization," that is, 
of the proposition that includes, implicitly or explicitly ("Mulattos are 
sometimes . . ."), a modifier such as "often," "usually," or 
"typically." For that matter, as Scriven has suggested, many 
historical explanations are grounded in similar truisms.23 To write, for 13
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example, that Louis XIV became unpopular because taxes were too 
high involves an underlying generalization such as "people do not like 
taxes" or "people do not like high taxes": an assertion which tells 
nothing new but presumably something true, and which is based on a 
reasonable knowledge of human behavior. These truisms usually 
remain implicit in scholarly discourse, insofar as they are regarded as 
too trivial, or too dull, to be worth mentioning. One of the arresting 
aspects of Carnival is that it expressly offers explanations ofthis kind, 
yet does so playfully, from a slight distance: a move that enables Le 
Roy Ladurie to pay homage to popular imagination, while pro- 
posing-indirectly and somewhat mischievously-a reflection on the 
nature of historical explanations. 
The last sign of the commenting "I" to be examined here is also 
the most conspicuous. It consists of the utterances traceable to what 
Barthes calls the "emotional person" of the historian ("Discours de 
l'histoire," p. 69), that is, of an aspect of the person that most 
researchers in the social and exact sciences have been trying to 
conceal or suppress. The narrator, in these passages, no longer 
accounts for the facts he has just reported: he evaluates them in terms 
of good or bad, renounces all pretense to objectivity (or, in 
Flaubertian terms, impassibility), and freely communicates his likes 
and dislikes. Before considering the many facets of this involvement, 
it must be briefly noted that the very choice of Romans is justified by a 
personal preference: as he states in the first paragraph, Le Roy 
Ladurie is fond of the town, the province, and their inhabitants. Of 
course, it helps that archives should be "overabundant" (p. 10). But 
the initial decision to write about Romans is ascribed to a certain 
"pleasure" in being there (p. 10), that is, to a factor (the researcher's 
enjoyment) which usually remains unstated and is not automatically 
associated with scholarship. Le Roy Ladurie's affection is imme- 
diately perceptible in a grammatical device common in a certain type 
of fiction: the casual use of the possessive adjective "our" to specify 
places and people ("Our hero . . ."), so as to involve the reader in an 
assumed shared familiarity with them. The narrator speaks frequently 
of "our town- (pp. 10, 13, 124, 229, etc.), "our province" (p. 62), or 
"our Dauphine" (p. 104), but also of "our peasants" (p. 18), "our 
revolt" (p. 17), and "our carnival" (p. 37). He even uses the 
expression "chez nous" (literally: at home) to designate the area, a 
phrase which can be understood in two ways, both idiosyncratic: 
either as a reference to "the place where I and you reader will live for 14




some time," or to "the place where I and they (the townspeople) are 
living right now." The second interpretation is more in accord with 
idiomatic tradition, but it implies, since Le Roy Ladurie cannot claim 
to be from Romans, some transfer from emotional to physical 
closeness-a transfer that locates the historian at the very place that 
will be the object of the investigation, and makes the site of research, 
ideally, into the home of the researcher. 
Although Le Roy Ladurie appreciates Romans, he does not care 
equally for all its groups and inhabitants. Providing a black and white 
picture of what happened in the town, he praises the third estate, 
whose performance leaves him "astounded and admiring" (p. 367); 
and he condemns the Romans establishment, in particular its leader, 
Judge Guerin. The latter is immediately presented as "inescapable" 
and "irremovable" (p. 32), an assessment which becomes harsher 
and harsher as the book proceeds: he is "the evil genius of the ruling 
class" (p. 129), a character "from a detective novel" ("un personnage 
de serie noire" p. 129), a "specialist of low blows" (p. 274), a "Tar- 
tuffe" (pp. 153, 241) and finally, a "Machiavelli" (p. 277), who has 
plotted from the start to use the carnival to crush the lower classes. 
Furthermore, the narrator comments negatively on Guerin's account 
of the events: he speaks of "malicious exaggeration" (p. 126), of 
"laughable" or "ridiculous" expressions (p. 248), charges the judge 
with "inventing" certain statements attributed to people (p. 251), and 
intersperses literal quotations from Guerin's text with brackets 
displaying a disapproving "sic" (p. 247). Le Roy Ladurie thus goes 
much beyond the usual criticism of the document. Guerin's 
testimonial is discredited, and it is compared very unfavorably with 
the other main' report on the events related to the carnival: the narra- 
tive written by the notary Piemond, a narrative which is deemed to be 
both "intimate" and "disinterested" (p. 251). 
Indirectly, authorial judgments are also expressed by means of 
punctuation. For the narrator makes extensive use of two signs which, 
in serious discourse, are ordinarily reserved to the editorial: suspen- 
sion points and exclamation marks. Both signs function rhetorically 
like the explicit evaluations which have just been mentioned insofar as 
they provide a negative comment on the behavior of the ruling class 
both during and after the 1580 carnival. Suspension points, in this 
regard, refer to a latent appraisal: the narrator could add something to 
the report of the facts, but he elects not to do so because conclusions 
are obvious and could be drawn by the reader himself. For instance, a 15
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general taxation of the nobility did not take place earlier than 1639 
"and even 1789 . . ." ( =very late, p. 72); a member of the 
establishment who was sentenced to death after carnival "did not do 
too badly . . . he was amnestied" ( =thanks to his rank, p. 298); and 
the blood of many old bourgeois families in Romans "turned blue 
slowly, surreptitiously . . ." ( =these families, because of their 
financial means, were ennobled, obtaining in the process both prestige 
and the much wanted tax-exempt status of the nobility, p. 365). As 
for exclamation marks, they are signs of the emotional "I," of its reac- 
tions to the report of some deed. They indicate that there is something 
peculiar (usually something to be indignant about) in the statement 
they close, and they amount to a "how + adjective" that would briefly 
comment on what has just been reported. For example, a tax 
perceptor who was appointed for one year is still in charge "six years 
later!" (how unlawful! p. 33); during the meetings of the three estates, 
the nobility has "the absolute majority!" (how unfair! p. 60); and the 
egalitarian tendencies of some lawyer did not keep him from being 
"ennobled ten years later, in 1605!" (how hypocritical! p. 364). 
Suspension points and exclamation marks noticeably alter the nature 
of the utterance, inasmuch as they turn it from an "assertion of" into a 
"reaction to." One can, as a test, substitute periods in the preceding 
examples and then measure the difference. True, the change does not 
totally erase the presence of the emotional subject, but it unques- 
tionably tones it down and brings these utterances closer to 
statements of what merely "is ."24 
No historical text, of course, comes without a partisan dimen- 
sion. As the most impersonal piece of history is traceable to an "1," 
the most balanced can be shown to originate in some ideological 
position-the ideal of objectivity being one of them. In this respect, 
what appears so uncommon in Carnival is the explicitness and the 
intensity of the partisanship. Most historians would have most likely 
been satisfied with letting the facts "speak for themselves," that is, 
they would have presented these facts in such a way as to program 
their reception. To use an old dichotomy from literary criticism, they 
would have "shown" Guerin's villainy and the third estate's merits 
without feeling compelled to "tell" them. Le Roy Ladurie, however, 
seems eager to settle his accounts in a way that cannot lend itself to 
any kind of ambiguity; and he makes no effort to dampen the fervor of 
his enthusiasms or to lessen the violence of his condemnations. 
Although the reception of the book has been generally favorable, this 16




strong presence of the historian together with his value system has 
often been felt as an unnecessary component of the text, as something 
which could (and should) have been eliminated in the name of 
scholarly neutrality. Le Roy Ladurie has been blamed for being 
excessively garrulous (Knecht), for siding indiscriminately with the 
underdog (Stone ), or for overusing exclamation marks to advocate his 
own beliefs (McFarlane). Likewise, as mentioned earlier, the 
American translation has to a certain extent weakened the devices 
which have. just been analyzed, notably in the area of punctuation. 
Whether in the reviews or in the translation, these forms of censure 
are revealing insofar as they point to a resistance: Le Roy Ladurie is 
perceived of as going too far, in this instance beyond the conventions 
of writing that rule historical discourse. In our perspective, which is 
less prescriptive than descriptive, the very fact that some aspects of 
the text should be considered as deviant, or at least unusual, is in itself 
significant. It shows that writing is not the last, non-problematic step 
in the research, but involves (and inscribes) an attitude toward the 
material. Furthermore, it shows that within a specific discipline, 
namely scholarly history, practitioners can be identified not only by 
their objects and methods, but also by their attitude towards accepted 
procedures of writing and their management of the very strategies of 
the text. 
III 
'In his essay "The Burden of History." White charges current 
historiography with being a combination of "late nineteenth-century 
social science" and "mid-nineteenth-century art." To correct this 
unfortunate state of affairs, he calls for an experimental type of history 
writing that would be based on "contemporary scientific and artistic 
insights," and would give historians the possibility of using 
"impressionistic, expressionistic, surrealistic, and (perhaps) even ac- 
tionistic modes of representation" ( Tropics of Discourse, pp. 45, 47). 
Judged by these standards, namely. the standards of contemporary 
fiction, Carnival obviously does not fit the bill: nor do, for that matter, 
most historical works of the twentieth century (White comes up with 
one example only: Norman 0. Brown's Life against Death). Yet, it 17
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could be argued that Carnival is innovative within its own "series": 
within the set of texts that our culture regards as belonging to scholarly 
history and classifies as such in bookstores or libraries. In this respect, 
the locus of interest of the book is not different from that of a book of 
fiction: it resides in the intertextual relationship which is established 
with other texts in the same series. The use of a highly visible and 
wide-ranging "I" can thus be regarded as instituting a dialogue with 
other historical practices. In the first place, it contrasts with the 
erasure of the signs of enunciation in the positivist historiography of 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, for instance in this 
positivist monument which is the Histoire de France written by 
Lavisse and his team. It also differs, although less sharply, from the 
procedures employed by historians who are much closer to the author 
of Carnival: let us say, to take two examples among many others, 
from Duby's cautious resort to the "I" in Le Dimanche de Bouvines 
(1973), or from Ozouf s stubborn utilization of the impersonal "on" 
in La Fete revolutionnaire (1976). Finally, it diverges from Le Roy 
Ladurie's own former usage: Les Paysans du Languedoc (1966) and 
Histoire du climat depuis l'an 1000(1967) were written according to 
different conventions, the "I" there being that of the histor and 
interpreter, never that of the emotional person. Le Roy Ladurie's 
"new manner" did not start before the mid-1970s, more precisely not 
until Montaillou (1975). As for the nature of this dialogue, it is, in 
Bakhtinian terms, "polemically colored."" Indeed, Le Roy Ladurie 
does not challenge some of the most ingrained habits of historical 
writing quietly: he loudly claims that he is doing so, and he flaunts his 
transgressions in the obvious, provocative manner which has caused 
the unhappiness of some reviewers and brought about changes in the 
American translation. 
If the narrative characteristics that have been described distin- 
guish Le Roy Ladurie from other historians, their significance is 
certainly not restricted to the textual level. Indeed, they enter into a 
new epistemological paradigm. They inscribe the shift from 
positivism to the New History, that is, from a view of history where 
the ideal had been to report the facts "as they happened" (it was, 
before Benveniste's, Ranke's famous formula: " Wie es eigentlich 
gewesen")," to a different view where this way of putting things is 
meaningless, since facts do not have an existence of their own, since 
their selection, ordering, and presentation depend on decisions which 
can only be made by the historian. In this respect, the extensive use of 18




the "I" in Carnival can be regarded as an aspect of a new rhetoric of 
truth, a rhetoric that is common to most texts of the New History, even 
though it is doubtless more prominent in Le Roy Ladurie's second 
manner than in any other work. In positivist writing, the dis- 
appearance of the speaker was like a guarantee of the purported 
objectivity of truth. In Le Roy Ladurie, the overt presence of the same 
speaker functions as a sign of an epistemological change; it refers to a 
radical relativism, to the belief that research is an activity which is 
always directed and grounded in a researcher. In other words, what Le 
Roy Ladurie seems to be saying is that he does not want to go on 
pretending: pretending that documents are objective givens and that 
the historical text constitutes their mere projection or continuation; 
that the same text can unfold itself, "naturally," without someone 
doing the unfolding; and that the scholarly endeavor can be devoid of 
personal involvement. The strategies displayed in Carnival are thus 
the textual equivalents of what linguists (Austin) or poeticians 
(Genette) have been saying about the nature of any utterance, 
sociologists (Habermas) about the nature of any research, and 
philosophers (Danto) about the nature of historical research 
specifically." In Le Roy Ladurie's practice, the historical text is no 
longer the mode of reporting "reality" in a way that would be 
transparent and non-problematic. It is thought of as a construct, and 
presented as such. 
Finally, beyond methodological and epistemological concerns, 
one should while examining Carnival allow for a certain pleasure 
which would be provided by the very act of writing: pleasure in moving 
away from the discursive constraints which were imposed on 
historians by positivism, and later by structuralism; pleasure in 
making comments, in drawing parallels, and in quoting from popular 
wisdom; pleasure in taking sides, in telling stories with heroes and 
villains; pleasure, in a word, in answering decisively and forcefully the 
question I asked at the beginning-a question every writer has to 
answer, the one with which Butor, recalling what might have been the 
point of the story, concludes his novel Degres: "Who is speaking?" 19
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